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Beyond individual choice --- Teams and Frames in Game Theory. By MICHAEL 
BACHARACH. Edited by NATALIE GOLD and ROBERT SUGDEN. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 2006. xxiii + 214 pp. 
 
 
 
With the death of Michael Bacharach in 2002 decision and game theory lost one of its 
original thinkers. Thanks to editors Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden the essence of his 
final project is now available in book form. In `Beyond Individual Choice'  Bacharach 
addresses two fundamental problems in the foundations of game theory: How can, and do, 
players coordinate on mutually beneficial equilibria? And what explains that players 
cooperate beyond that even in one-shot games? 
 
The subtitle of the book --- `teams and frames in game theory' --- characterises 
Bacharach's approach very well. In contrast to evolutionary or behavioral approaches he 
writes in the tradition of classical game theory and seeks explanations and concepts that 
model such coordination and cooperation as rational choices. It is the rationality concept 
itself that is re-examined in this work. 
 
Key to Bacharach's theory is a distinction between the actual strategy set of a game and 
its description that informs the player's reasoning and choice. A frame is a set of possible 
descriptions of subsets of strategies. A framed game is a normal form game in which each 
player has a frame, together with a probability that an individual description in the frame 
is available to the player when he reasons strategically and makes his choice. Beliefs 
about the opponent's frame are then derived from the descriptions that are actually 
available to the player. This model allows Bacharach to formulate the (attractive) 
assumption that a description not available to the player in choosing his own strategy will 
also not be available to him when reasoning about his opponent. 
 
In this framed game a player picks a description that is available to him. If the description 
applies to more than one strategy then one of them is chosen randomly. A variable frame 
equilibrium is then a Nash equilibrium in this framed game. Among these equilibria 
Bacharach then eliminates (roughly put) those equilibria for which a symmetric 
counterpart can be found (because rationality arguments cannot distinguish between them) 
and selects the payoff-dominant remaining equilibrium as the solution to the original 
game. Bacharach argues that this construction yields the salient equilibrium in a 
coordination game (even if not payoff-dominant) as the --- possibly unique --- variable 
frame equilibrium of the framed game. 
 
This approach has many intriguing aspects, although some problems remain. For example, 
the analysis depends heavily on how the frame is specified. While the approach sheds 
some light on how a salient equilibrium of the original game is chosen, it is silent on what 
makes an equilibrium salient. In particular, a payoff-dominant equilibrium need not be 
salient, yet payoff-dominance plays an important role in defining a variable frame 
equilibrium. Overall the model appears to be much better at rationalising observed 
choices than at making sharp predictions.  
 
After a thorough and scholarly review of sources in the psychology and sociology 
literature Bacharach next argues that coordination games trigger group identification, 
meaning that players frame their role in the game as members of a group. The author then 
devotes a chapter on how group identification is consistent with, or even follows from 
evolutionary theory.   
 
Bacharach’s theory then comes into its own when he (implicitly) applies his concept of a 
variable frame equilibrium to the frame created by group identification in coordination 
games. Intuitively,  this frame allows team reasoning, in which a player identifies the 
strategy that leads to the best outcome for the group. This, in turn, is proposed as an 
explanation for selecting the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a coordination game.  
 
Sadly, Bacharach did not live to complete the argument and it is left to the editors  
to elaborate on it in the conclusion. (They also note a tension between these concepts, 
however.)  There the editors also explain how this theory accounts for cooperation as a 
--- frame based --- `equilibrium’ outcome in the prisoners’ dilemma.  
  
The book consists of four chapters written by Bacharach and intended to form the core of 
a nine-chapter volume. These chapters are put into context by an introductory chapter 
written by the editors, and their conclusion rounds off the work. The editorial work is 
superb. The editors provide background, history and clarification, while always 
separating clearly the original text, their additions based on the author’s material, and 
their own interpretations. The profession owes them a debt of gratitude for making 
Bacharach’s thinking publicly available. That aspects of his theory can be criticised 
should not distract from the value of an original approach. Coordination and cooperation 
are topics of fundamental importance in social science, and Bacharach’s ideas merit to be 
further explored. 
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